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Abstract 
 
Biodiversity conservation in low-income economies is a vital issue and hence needs to be 
addressed for development and poverty eradication. A variety of empirical works exist on 
the subject, but the focus is often limited on the search for possible causes of biodiversity 
erosion. Research on the “driving forces” that influence biodiversity conservation effort is 
still largely missing, especially for developing countries. In this study, we seek to address this 
gap. We test, using different models, the impact of some domestic and external factors on 
countries’ conservation effort measured by the Ecoregion score. We examine specifically 
whether strategic interactions matter in conservation policymaking at the country level. The 
model is tested on a data set comprising 48 sub-Saharan African countries spanning over the 
period 1990-2009. Through the obtained results, we give empirical evidence that, in the 
context of underdevelopment especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, strengthening governance is 
an effective mean to support the promotion of biodiversity conservation. In addition, we 
find that countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are inﬂuenced by their contiguous neighbors in 
environmental policy for biodiversity management. Finally, the results suggest that tourism 
development is a valuable incentive to raise governments’ dedication to conservation in Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
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1 Introduction  
‘Biodiversity’ is an umbrella term that covers all life on the planet, from the genetic level 
to terrestrial, freshwater and marine habitats and ecosystems (TEEB, 2009). It can be thought 
of as an economic good (Baumgärtner, 2006; Heal 2000) as it is obviously scarce, it satisfies 
human needs and allows people to achieve certain ends (Baumgartner, 2007). By offering 
provisioning services along with regulating, cultural and supporting ones, the diversity of 
species, ecosystem and genes – in reference to biodiversity (MEA, 2005) - underpins our 
global economy as well as human well-being (TEEB, 2009).  
The benefits from biodiversity are in most case marked by nonrivalry in consumption, 
nonexcludability, and are quasi universal in terms of countries, people and generations (Kaul 
et al, 1999). ‘Biodiversity’ can therefore be thought also of as a global public good. 
 
The supply of this “global public economic good” to humankind is increasingly threatened. 
The seriousness of the situation has been borne out by different international reports (IUCN, 
2004; MEA, 2005; TEEB, 2010). It has been established that in the last century we have lost 
35% of mangroves, 40% of forests, 50% of wetlands and that 60% of ecosystem services have 
been degraded in fifty years (TEEB, 2010). The current species loss is 100 to 1,000 times than 
in geological times and will get worse with climate change (MEA, 2005). The threats are 
however more acute in the tropical developing countries where much of the biodiversity 
resides and where people are less able to adjust to change as compared to developed countries 
(MEA, 2005) . 
 
The overall cost of the current biodiversity loss is unknown.  Yet, some parts of this cost, 
including the costs of lost bio-prospecting leads, the costs of lost carbon storage, the costs of 
lost tourism business and the costs of diminished watershed protection, amount to many tens 
of billions of dollars (Heal, 2005). For the entire biosphere, the economic value of 17 
ecosystem services has been approximated to be in average of US$33 trillion per year 
(Constanza et al, 1997). The costs of inaction in respect to biodiversity loss are not equitably 
distributed and are more discriminatory for poor people since natural resources are a basic 
source of their income generation (MEA, 2005).  Despite the lack of precise knowledge about 
the costs of biodiversity loss, the global recognition of the economic and human dimension of 
biodiversity loss still persist, along with  the need for urgent actions.  
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The debate on strategies to slow the trend of biodiversity loss has lead to an increasing 
interest of researchers and scholars on different concerns related to biodiversity issues. In that 
broad framework, many theoretical and empirical studies have attempted to better understand 
the socio-economic causes of biodiversity loss (Kerr and Currie, 1995; McNeely, 1996; 
Asafu-Adjaye, 2003; McPherson and Nieswiadomy, 2005; Freytag et al, 2009; Pandit and 
Laband, 2009); or to assess the real value of biodiversity for humankind (Bingham et al, 1995; 
Constanza et al, 1997; Seidl and Moraes, 2000; Sagoff, 2011). Little has been done however 
to analyse biodiversity conservation policy-making. In fact, there is a dearth of analyses that 
attempt to understand the mechanisms that conduct governments’ conservation strategies as 
well as allocation of public funds for biodiversity conservation. The studies that exist on 
governments’ dedication to species conservation have been narrowed to species 
characteristics only (Simon et al., 1995; Metrick and Weitzman, 1998; Dawson and Shogren, 
2001;   Mahoney, 2009). Fewer studies have focused on others determinants for biodiversity 
conservation policymaking, including the papers of Lightfoot (1994), Dietz and Adger (2003), 
Archer and Orr (2008). Lightfoot (1994) examined the relationship between level of 
development and establishment of parks and reserves. He found as main result that a 
country’s development level has no deterministic effect on formal attempts to establish 
preserved areas. Dietz and Adger (2003) performed a study to find out the relationship 
between economic development and the level of government intervention in designating 
protected areas. According to their results, there is a possible tendency towards increased 
conservation efforts with increasing income. Archer and Orr (2008) used a simple linear 
model on 129 countries, to test four groups of predictors to land protection: biodiversity, 
environmental threats, politics (such as treaty participation and NGO activity), and economics 
(such as GDP and trade measures). They ascertained that environmental threats represent the 
strongest individual reason for land protection.  
 
In this study we propose to further investigation on biodiversity conservation policymaking in 
order to add to the sparse literature on this axis of biodiversity conservation debate. We aim to 
identify specifically the main factors that drive governments’ effort for biodiversity 
conservation.  
We begin by considering biodiversity as diversity of genes, species, and ecosystems in a 
given area and adopting the concept of biome as its measure.  Biomes are defined as "the 
world's major communities, classified according to the predominant vegetation and 
characterized by adaptations of organisms to that particular environment" (Campbell 1996). 
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Biodiversity conservation effort is then measured as the capacity of a given country to 
conserve a proportion of each biome within its territory.  
Next, we identify a specific study area guided by two considerations. Firstly, we consider that 
address the question of factors that influence biodiversity conservation policymaking  at a 
global scale as it has be done in previous studies (Dietz and Adger, 2003; Archer and Orr, 
2008) seems problematic, because it supposes that there is homogeneity of government’s 
behaviour between countries. Secondly, we think that the need of knowledge about 
biodiversity conservation is more critical for “biodiversity-development hotspot” (see map in 
Appendix A) in reference to areas where we find high threat on biodiversity and low 
economic development. In fact, the challenge to respond to biodiversity problems is 
interconnected to the major obstacle that is poverty. Along with these considerations, we limit 
the study to sub-Saharan African region, one of the poorest regions in the world which exhibit 
some common structural, politics and economics characteristics.  This region has also the 
world’s second largest tropical rainforests and homes the majority of “hot spot” of 
biodiversity of Africa (see map in Appendix A).  
Finally, we extend the factors proposed in previous studies, by testing the existence of 
strategic interaction in conservation policymaking, in the context of developing countries. 
This assumption is supported by the fact that we consider that the development of funds for 
conservation and of biodiversity-based revenue generating activities, have increased the value 
of biodiversity. This, in turn has raised the benefits from conservation and consequently the 
opportunity cost of biodiversity loss in the developing countries i.e. the cost of inaction. The 
presumption is that, given the fact that these economic incentives are based on allocation 
criteria or market share, if countries’ strategies for biodiversity management are sensitive to 
these economics incentives, developing countries can be leaded in win-lose competition. 
Countries would then incorporate information on conservation policies in others countries into 
their own policies making decisions and be induced in strategic interactions.   
 
The next section reviews previous researches carried out in assessing determinants of 
biodiversity conservation efforts, and details the specific hypotheses of the study. Section 3 
presents the data and methodology used in the analysis while section 4 discusses the empirical 
results derived. The last section provides the conclusion of the paper. 
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2 Biodiversity conservation effort: previous and new assumptions  
When searching for empirical studies on biodiversity conservation policymaking, it is striking 
that little has been done on the topic. It exist however a variety of work on environmental 
policymaking in general, that could be applied to conservation policies. According to this 
literature, causal factors for environmental policymaking can be categorized into domestic 
and external factors.   
2.1 External influences 
External influences in the framework of biodiversity conservation refer here to factors such as 
multilateral negotiations and treaties. In this study we include a new hypothesis in this range 
of determinants.  We consider that competition for international funds can be an important 
driving force for biodiversity conservation policymaking in the context of developing 
countries.  
2.1.1 Multilateral negotiations and treaties 
As global integration proceeds, domestic policy objectives—such as public health, economic 
growth or environmental protection—are increasingly subject to international forces (Kaul et 
al., 1999). Those forces lead to a race to the top or at least as a move towards more 
encompassing environmental policies in countries (Kern et al., 2000). Analyzing the reasons 
of external influence on environmental policy decisions, Carraro and Siniscalco (1992) argue 
that external demand for improvements in the quality of global environmental goods such as 
rain forests, global climate or biodiversity affect national strategies. Botcheva and Martin 
(2001) also assume that high negative externalities (both environmental and economic) make 
states benefit from choosing the same course of action, which leads to convergence. The 
convergence of states environmental policies result from different mechanisms. Busch and 
Jörgens (2005) propose a typology of three broad classes of them: harmonization (in terms of 
negotiation, legalization, compliance and enforcement though resolution, convention or 
protocol implementation), coercive imposition (through economic conditionality), and 
diffusion mechanisms (as a process by which policy innovations are communicated in the 
international system and adopted voluntarily by an increasing number of countries over time).  
On biodiversity concerns, the main driving forces behind the spread of conservation strategies 
seem to be harmonization and diffusion. In fact, many multilateral negotiations aim to induce 
countries to adopt national conservation policies that provide global benefits. For instance, the 
convention on biological diversity (CBD), the Convention on International Trade in 
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Endangered Species (CITES), and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture, all emphasize the benefits to nation-states of acting in global interest. 
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play also a key role in forcing leaders and 
policymakers to pay attention (Simmons, 1998) for biodiversity conservation. They have an 
increasingly prominent role in international environmental institutions, participating in many 
activities—negotiation, monitoring, and implementation—traditionally reserved to states 
(Raustiala, 1997). 
In the specific case of  Africa, a convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources has existed since 1968 but has had a relatively low level of activity and global 
relevance. It was revised in 2003, in Maputo, guarantying stronger institutional tools to ensure 
its implementation. Under the impetus of the World Conservation Strategy, we observe that 
national conservation strategies became increasingly institutionalized in Africa in mid-1980s 
(Falloux et al., 1990).  Also, in the period following the Rio Conference, more than half of 
African countries had drafted or were in the process of drafting their National Environmental 
Action Plans NEAP, which included conservation strategies (Kamto, 1996).  
   
2.1.2 International Funds  
Biodiversity conservation represents a growing important target for international assistance in 
direction of developing countries. Indeed, the large part of the world's biological diversity 
resides in tropical countries where there are the least resources to conserve them (Pearce, 
2007). The preservation of the main environmental services provided at local and global scale 
by biodiversity, require thus some international funding mechanisms in favor of countries 
which have great biological patrimony. These mechanisms have in charge with meeting the 
‘incremental cost’ of developing countries' provision of global environmental goods (Pearce, 
2007) i.e. the additional costs without which, we couldn’t go to the global optimum of 
environmental services supply. Theses mechanisms are of different kinds and are mostly 
supported by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) established in 1991 in the World Bank 
to assist in the protection of the global environment and to promote environmental sustainable 
development. These funding are important levers in the implementation of environmental 
strategies in most developing countries which often have limited national budget and face 
problems with more basic issues such as health, poverty and mitigation. They represent also 
strong incentives to encourage poor countries for sustainable development and biodiversity 
conservation. Depending on selectivity for the allocation of these financial resources, we 
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assume that developing countries may be in competition to be a recipient of a specific 
funding, thereby involving them in strategic calculus. 
 
Ambiguous claims exist about whether there is selectivity between countries for international 
assistance concerning environmental target. Donors are expected to respond to constituency 
demands for greater effectiveness and environmental performance or to avoid selectivity in 
order to maintain their budget amounts (Svensson, 2003; Chong and Gradstein, 2008). 
Recipients that can determine important global environmental outcomes unilaterally, like 
Brazil with tropical forests or China with climate change, would receive high amounts of aid 
even if they only deliver lackluster performance on project objectives (Darst, 2001). For the 
specific case of international funding such as REED or partnership with pharmaceutical firms 
for instance, the more performing a country is, comparatively to similar countries for 
conserving its biological patrimony, more probable it is attractable for these funds. Referring 
to these claims, if there is an allocation criteria, then it is subject to performance-based or 
risky-based selectivity. If the criterion is based on the comparative risky situation, the level of 
species extinction for instance, then the best strategy for a country is to be less efficient in 
order to attract maximum support. If the criterion is rather the comparative performance, then 
the strategy is to show superior effort comparatively to other countries.  
2.2 Domestic factors  
Which domestic determinants drive environmental policymaking at a country level?  A 
widely held view among those in the environmental science is that promotion of economic 
growth and its induced policies balance environmental strategies.   
Some sectoral policies such as in the tourism sector have also a growing impact on 
conservation policymaking. We assume in this study that countries competitive strategies to 
tourism market share influence their effort in biodiversity conservation.  
2.2.1 Growth promotion  
Economic growth is thought to be incompatible with environmental protection. In fact, studies 
in environmental economics and environmental policy often cited tradeoffs between 
protecting the environment and encouraging growth. 
When looking at empirical findings from literature, we notice different conclusions regarding 
the role of economic development on biodiversity conservation policies. Archer and Orr 
(2008) found that economic predictors are not relevant to conservation strategies. They 
suggest that biodiversity factors (forest area, species richness) and environmental threats (high 
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anthropogenic impact and timber harvest rates) are primary incentives of protected land 
policies. According to their result, politics and economics are not influential parameters of 
conservation and argue that protection policies are not necessarily “meaningful” policies, 
which require both political and economic resources. 
A number of scholars assume contrarily that a conflict between economic growth and 
biodiversity conservation exist (Czech, 2003). In fact, the acceleration of economic 
development with the intensification of production and consumption activities exacerbated by 
an increase of population, act as disincentives to biodiversity conservation policies. Indeed 
tireless efforts to meet the needs of population in terms of consumption goods and arable land 
may lead to policies that increase resource depletion at a rate which often exceeds the rate of 
resource regeneration. In developing countries for instance, extensive agriculture with high 
rate of deforestation and natural habitat loss, to respond to near-term security of food supplies, 
weaken countries’ capacity to protect biodiversity. 
The development of trade in respect to economic development promotion also affects 
countries’ environmental strategies. Liberal trade policies are seen to favor an environmental 
“race to the bottom” and contribute to declining environmental quality (Grether and deMelo, 
2003). Jorgensen and Kick (2006) argue that high levels of export dependence have many 
consequences for the domestic ecology, such as depletion of raw materials and pollution 
concentrations.  
 At other extreme, are those who argue that economic development may promote a country’s 
effort for conservation (Lightfoot, 1994). Dietz and Adger (2003) demonstrate that there is a 
positive relationship between economic development and the level of government 
intervention, for example in designating protected areas although it is not the overriding 
determinant of the rate of designation. Shogren et al. (1999) declare that communities with 
greater wealth and lower relative land prices can better afford to preserve more habitats. 
These optimistic views on the biodiversity income relation think that high level of 
development induces changes of population preferences and improvements of institution 
quality that influence government to make choice in favor of biodiversity conservation 
(Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2001). The increase of preference for the preservation of 
biodiversity occurs with improvement of education and raise in life expectancy that result in 
rise in domestic demand for environmental goods. As evidence, Freytag et al. (2009) found 
that educational level raises awareness and sensitizes people to protect nature.  It has been 
also established that the more democratic a policy is, defined as the sum of political rights and 
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civil liberty, the more biodiversity is protected in terms of species richness (Dietz and Adger, 
2003) and of protected land areas (Midlarsky, 1998).  
A third hypothesis postulates that the relationship between economic development objectives 
and biodiversity conservation effort is not strictly linear.  There exist a biodiversity 
conservation Kuznets curve (BKC), which would assume that in the early stages of the 
development process, efforts to accelerate economic development kept conservation effort as 
negligible objectives, but reverse once high levels of development is reached. Recent studies 
exist on Kuznets curve for biodiversity, but the majority of them use biodiversity loss 
indicators (Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2001; Dietz and Adger, 2003; McPherson and 
Nieswiadomy, 2005; Mozumder et al., 2006; Pandit and Laband, 2009; Mills and Waite, 
2009). They investigate thus a non-linear relation between income and biodiversity erosion 
along development path. Bimonte (2002) attempted to test EKC for conservation effort, using 
percentage of protected area for European countries. His analysis accepted EKC hypothesis 
for conservation effort. While EKC was not tested, Halkos and Tzeremes (2010) found a 
different impact of economic development on conservation effort along development level. 
Their results suggest that economic development has a negative impact on biodiversity 
performances for developing countries, but a positive influence for developed countries. 
2.2.2 Sectoral policies: Tourism sector and biodiversity conservation  
Recently, tourism has become one of the most dynamic economic sectors in many developing 
countries. It represented over 70% of exports of services and was the primary source of 
foreign exchange earnings in 46 out of 50 of the world’s least developed countries in 2005 
(UNWTO, 2008). For instance, in Sub-Saharan Africa, tourism is a promising source of 
development (Christie and Crompton, 2001). According to the WTT data (2011), the total 
contribution of Travel &Tourism to the region’s GDP, including its wider economic impacts, 
augmented from 4.76 % (1990) to 9.8% (2009) showing an increase of 106%. The market 
share in the Sub-Saharan region, comparatively to Africa was a growth at 40.76% between 
1990 and 2005 (UNWTO, 2006).  For the next ten years, the total contribution to GDP is 
expected to rise by 5.3%, and the total contribution to employment is forecast to augment by 
2.6%. Countries in Africa are now widely focusing on tourism as a source of growth and 
diversification. 
Many tourism attractions in developing countries are closely linked to biodiversity, such as 
protected areas, unspoiled mountains, beaches and islands, traditional ways of life and native 
culture, charismatic wildlife and natural landscapes. In terms of competition with other 
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destinations, a site’s biodiversity profile might give the destination site a competitive edge or 
advantage (Macagno et al., 2009).Over the last decade, nature and adventure travel has 
emerged as one of the fastest-growing segments of the industry. Much of this growth is taking 
place in mega-diverse sites, areas harboring many species unique to that region (Christ et al, 
2003).Biological diversity gives therefore a strategic advantage to the country’s sector for 
tourism. As tourism has an increasing place in the development processes in Sub-Saharan 
African countries, with destinations engaged in a win-lose competition, we postulate that each 
country’s conservation strategy, will be influenced by the choices of the others.  
3 Empirical models of biodiversity conservation effort 
Here, we present data, variables and the methodology used to identify the main forces that 
influence conservation policymaking in sub-Saharan African region 
3.1 Data and variables 
We use the indicator “Ecoregion protection” developed by the Center for International Earth 
Science Information Network (CIESIN) of Columbia University and the Yale Center for 
Environmental Law and Policy of Yale University, as dependant variable. Following the 
discussion in section 2, we introduce also different independants variables in the models. 
3.1.1 The dependant variable: Ecoregion as country’s biodiversity management 
indicator 
The Ecoregion protection score measures the degree to which a country achieves the target of 
protecting at least 10% of each biome (desert, forest, grassland …) within its country's land 
area. The cap of 10% is consistent with international target following the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), at its 7th Conference of the Parties. To calculate the indicator, a 
ratio is attributed to each biome in reference with its actual protection status and according to 
the target.  The ratio of each biome is then weighted by share of biome's area in the country 
land area, averaged and converted in percentage to obtain a global score, scaled to 0-100.  A 
score of 100% means that 10% of all biomes in a country are at least protected. (See 
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/epi/to for more details about the indicator). 
Ecoregion, as a measure of environmental policies, reflect well the actions undertaken by 
governments to protect biodiversity. Indeed the protected status of an area is most often a 
political decision, and by and large stems from the policy process, political actors, and 
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governmental decision making. While some conservation actions are initiated by NGOs, 
policies are usually implemented by the government. 
Ecoregion score assessments of the degree of protection in a country do not provide 
information on the efficacy of conservation strategies. In fact, protected status is not sufficient 
for an ecological region to be “effectively conserved”. However, it is necessary and an initial 
condition for committing state financial and administrative resources and for actual protection 
to begin (CIESIN, 2010; Archer and Orr, 2008). As the aim of this paper is to assert 
predictors of conservation strategies, the indicator “Ecoregion score” is therefore valid and 
appropriate for it. (See appendix 2 for descriptive statistics on Ecoregion score)  
3.1.2 Independent variables 
As independent variables, we introduce in the models GDP per capita and its square to test for 
a linear or a U shaped relationship.  The adequate functional form would be chosen according 
to corrected Akaike information criterion ((AICc1). The income variable is derived from the 
world development indicators (WDI) and measured in US$;  We add the variable Trade from 
WDI database calculated as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as 
a share of gross domestic product. We separately use export (% GDP) to precise the effect of 
trade openness on biodiversity in the context of sub-Saharan Africa region. Agriculture valued 
added in % GDP is also introduced as explanatory variable. Data comes from WDI database. 
We use the density of population expressed as people per square km of land area and total 
population as demographic variables. Data comes from WDI database. The World Bank 
governance indicators of Government Effectiveness is used as proxy for the institutional 
quality of a country in the models. The source is Kaufmann et al. (2006). The combined gross 
enrolment ratio in education (both sexes)) (%) from International Human Development 
Indicators controls for the educational level. Initial forest cover expressed in % of land area is 
added to control for resource endowment. Data comes from FAO. Percentage of expected 
reports submitted for the implementation of CITES (Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species) is introduced to measure countries participation to environmental 
agreements and treaties. Data comes from World Resources Institute (2001). To test for 
competitiveness hypothesis we use data on tourist arrival expressed in number from UNWTO 
(2006) and Official Development Assistance.  
                                                 
1
 AIC scores are based on information theory and rest on the assumption that while no particular model is true, 
the model with the smallest AIC value is the most appropriate (or best) choice of the models under consideration. 
A corrected AIC is recommended to account for small sample sizes (Burnham et al1998). The best model was 
the model with the lowest AICc score (Burnharn et al. 1998) 
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All explanatory variables are averaged for a period of  20 years (1990-2009). By this 
procedure, we focus on today biodiversity conservation effort based on factors that have 
influenced it over the past 20 years (McPherson and Nieswiadomy, 2005). This procedure 
also makes our study immune to short-term effects. Our database comprises a sample of 48 
sub-Saharan African countries presented in Appendix B. Summary statistics of independent 
variables are presented in appendix 2. 
3.2 Econometric strategy 
The purpose of this study is to identify the driving forces of biodiversity conservation effort in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. We begin by a simple model, where we test the effect of conventional 
factors on our dependant variable: the Ecoregion score. Next, we estimate the spatial model, 
which includes spatial information to test for strategic interaction. Finally we test our 
competition hypothesis by developing an economic competition model.  
3.2.1 Simple model  
The simple model specification is:  
 
                                                       [1] 
 
Where Z is country i Ecoregion score; X is a vector of country i characteristics;  vector of 
unknown parameter and i the error term which is assumed to be normally distributed, 
homoscedastic, and independent across observations. 
3.2.2 Strategic interaction model  
In order to test the occurrence of strategic interaction in the conservation policymaking, we 
include in equation [1] a “strategic decision variable”	 
 , composing of a set of 
weights (
 that aggregate the Ecoregion score of other countries (. We obtain then 
equation [2] 
 
  	 
                                              [2] 
 
The relationship described in equation [2], implies that a country’s biodiversity performance 
depends on its own characteristics (vector of Xi) and the performance of its neighbors. In the 
spatial econometrics literature, this specification (equation [2]) is known as a “spatial lag” 
model (Anselin, 1988). The goal of the econometric analysis is to test the significance of 
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unknown parameters: , . If the null hypothesis can be rejected for , then the evidence 
would point to the existence of strategic interaction among states for biodiversity 
conservation.  
Before the estimation we have to deal with some spatial issues: spatial weights definition, 
spatial correlation tests, endogeneity and spatial error dependence issues 
 
− Spatial weights 
One major issue in spatial model is to define Wij, the weighting matrix which assigns a value 
to each pair of states. Generally Wij has zero diagonal elements, and a representative off-
diagonal element wij. The values of the wij’s are specified arbitrarily and reflect expectations 
regarding the spatial pattern of interaction. For example, Wij could reflect the assumption that 
countries involved in strategic interaction are those sharing a border. In this case, the jth 
element of the ith row of Wij equals 1 if i and j are neighbors and equals 0 otherwise. This 
weighting scheme, based on a geographical proximity, is the one common use and is named 
“binary contiguity matrix”. Other weighting schemes have been developed in literature. For 
instance, while admitting the importance of geographical proximity, some authors argue that 
not all neighbors should be given equal weight, and weight elements of contiguous matrix by 
neighbors’ characteristics, such as population size or income level (Brueckner, 1998; 
Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998; Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; Fredriksson and Millimet, 
2002). Others postulate that countries with similar demographics and economics structures 
may exert the most powerful mutual influences. They then use matrices whose weights are 
based on similarity in demographic or economic characteristics between countries, regardless 
of distance (Case et al., 1993). In addition to the two weighting schemes, we test a third one 
which considers the importance of both geographic proximity and socio-economic similarity. 
Thus, we hypothesize that countries i,j will interact more if they are  geographically close and 
have more demographic or economic similarity. 
Following the above considerations, the analysis was performed using different weighting 
schemes (see appendix 3). We can therefore explore several alternative criteria for 
neighborliness, and then better understand the nature of the interdependencies between 
countries. If all the matrix show significant results, we will use an absurd weighting scheme –
a placebo matrix- to verify whether there is something inherent to the econometric procedure 
that produces significant results regardless of how ‘neighbors’ are defined (see Case et al., 
(1993) for the same procedure) 
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− Spatial correlation tests  
We perform some diagnostics tests to check for the presence of spatial dependence and if so, 
if a spatial lag model is the correct specification. We use: (1) the best-known Moran’s I 
(Moran, 1948) to check for the presence of spatial autocorrelation in the data;(2) The 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test, which tests the null hypothesis H0 : =0 in model [2]; (3) The 
robust Lagrange Multiplier test (Anselin et al., 1996) to investigate for error dependence in a 
multidirectional  spatial model that  includes both the spatial lag term and a spatially 
correlated error structure. 
 
− Endogeneity and spatial error dependence 
Two main econometric issues must be confronted in estimating our spatial model. These are 
endogeneity of the Zj in model [2], and possible existence of spatial error dependence 
(Anselin, 1988).  
The hypothesis of strategic interaction supposes that, one state incorporate the decisions of its 
neighboring states into its own decision-making process, and vice versa. The values of Z in 
the sample are then, jointly determined in exactly the same fashion. The variable wijZ on the 
right-hand side of model [2] is then endogenous. As a result, parameters of OLS are 
inconsistent. One alternative to address this econometric problem is to use maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimation (Brueckner, 2003). A second alternative is to perform 
instrumental variables (IV) estimation. The instruments used are some of the attributes 
included in Xi (country characteristics) for neighboring states, employing the same weighting 
scheme for the instruments as we do for neighboring environmental stringency (Brueckner, 
2003). State’s characteristics are valid instruments if they affect the state’s own environmental 
policy, but not the environmental decisions in neighboring states. (See Fredriksson and 
Millimet, (2002) for a similar argument). A third solution consists of replacing the weighted 
averages of neighboring states’ environmental performance in the model with lagged values 
(Smith 1997, Fredriksson and Millimet, 2002). We will therefore obtain the following n-year 
lag model:  
 
  	 
        n={1, 2, 3,..}                                   [3] 
 
In addition to resolving the problem of endogeneity- since current own biodiversity 
performance cannot impact the past environmental policies of neighboring states, this 
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specification allows us to test for an adjustment period in strategic interaction.  
The presence of spatial error dependence in the equation complicates also the analysis. When 
error dependence is ignored, estimation can provide false evidence of strategic interaction. 
Such spatial error dependence arises when error term includes omitted country characteristics 
that are themselves spatially dependent. To avoid drawing such incorrect conclusions, we can 
estimate the model via ML techniques under the assumption that spatial error dependence is 
absent, relying on hypothesis tests to verify this absence. Another solution is to rely on the IV 
estimation method. Kelejian and Prucha (1998) show that IV estimation generates a consistent 
estimate of spatial lag coefficient even in the presence of spatial error dependence.  
 
3.2.3 Economic competition model  
We have postulated that strategic interaction is induced by economic competition for tourism 
market share and international assistance. We check for this competitiveness hypothesis, 
following this process:  
We create a gap variable Gap_Ii for tourism activity and international support between each 
country and its neighbors: 
 
Gap_Ii =  	     
 
Where, I={tourism indicator, international assistance indicator}, Ni is the number of borders 
state i shares, J=set of i neighbors. We postulate that this gap variable act like transmission 
channels. To test it, we include each gap variable (or its lagged value) in model [2] (in model 
[3]), allowing the strategic decision variable to affect indirectly the country conservation 
effort. We verify next the effect of strategic decision variable on each transmission channel. 
We test the economic competition model with the n-year lag model in order to resolve 
potential problem of endogeneity between the gap variable and the dependant variable. We 
then use lagged values for the gap variable, and estimate the following equations for 1-year 
lag model: 
 


  
      !"#
     
  !"$ %
&
' (") 
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4 Results 
4.1 Simple model  
Table 1 contains the first set of estimation results. Column 1 and 2 present results of simple 
models, testing EKC hypothesis and linear relationship between Ecoregion score and GDP per 
capita.  
The quadratic and linear equations both fit the data significantly (see F-statistics). To 
determine which functional form best represents the data, we use the corrected Akaike 
information criterion (AICc). The data support a linear relationship according to the best 
model as determined by AICc score (AICc linear= 475,9; AICc quadratic=478, 9). Beyond 
the shape of the relationship, we failed to find any evidence of influence of GDP per capita on 
Ecoregion score. In fact, in both equations, the income variables are not significant at the 10% 
level. This result is unexpected, and contradicts literature which states that economic variable 
would have an important negative effect on conservation effort in a context of 
underdevelopment like that for sub-Saharan African countries. On the other hand, this finding 
is consistent with Archer and Orr (2008) who argue that land protection policies are not 
necessarily “meaningful” protection policies, which would require economic resources. 
The resource endowment variable (forest initial) has a significant positive effect on Ecoregion 
score indicating that conservation effort is greater, in countries with more protectable area. 
The export variable is not statistically significant, but has the expected negative sign. We 
found the same results using the variable trade. Commercial activities seem to be not relevant 
in predicting levels of biomes protection. The agriculture variable (agrigdp) is not significant 
as well as countries participation to biodiversity protection treaties (CITES). For demographic 
variables, the density variable has a negative impact on Ecoregion score but is not quite 
statistically significant. The population variable exhibits a significant positive coefficient. 
Surprisingly, this result indicates that prioritizing population size, conservation effort 
becomes more stringent. In fact, the widely accepted view, the anthropogenic hypothesis, 
points an adverse effect of population on conservation. Nevertheless, some studies have found 
such a positive impact of population on conservation effort (Archer and Orr, 2008; Dietz and 
Adger, 2003). Archer and Orr (2008) argued that population can positively drive conservation 
effort though a reactionary policy approach as a rationale for protecting land or people’s 
preference for beautiful areas. 
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t-statistics are in parentheses; * Indicates p-value less than 0.10; ** Indicates p-value less than 0.05; *** Indicates p-value less than 0.01 
Table 1.Estimations results for simple and strategic interaction models 
Dependant variable : Ecoregion Score of country i 
 
Simple model (equation 1) 
 
Strategic interaction models (equation 2&3) 
Variables 
EKC  
MCO coefficient 
Linear  
MCO coefficient   
Model2  
ML coefficient 
Model 2  
IV coefficient 
Model 3 
MCO coefficient 
forinitial1 0.815*** 0.825*** 
 
0.821*** 0.815*** 0.828*** 
 
(4.08) (4.13) 
 
(4.40) (3.85) (4.43) 
agrigdp 0.299 0.360 
 
0.386 0.420 0.344 
 
(0.74) (0.97) 
 
(0.90) (0.86) (0.78) 
lgdp -14.748 1.478 
 
2.281 3.338 0.326 
 
(-0.30) (0.15) 
 
(0.31) (0.40) (0.04) 
lgdp2 1.161 
  
   
 
(0.33) 
  
   
exportm -0.020 -0.013 
 
0.035 0.099 0.067 
 
(-0.04) (-0.03) 
 
(0.10) (0.24) (0.16) 
moydens -0.037 -0.036 
 
-0.022 -0.005 0.002 
 
(-0.83) (-0.82) 
 
(-0.56) (-0.09) (0.04) 
moypopto 3.91 E-7** 3.85 E-7** 
 
4.08 E-07** 4.38 E-07** 3.86 E-07** 
 
(2.41) (2.47) 
 
(2.19) (2.05) (2.47) 
moygov1 11.484 11.721 
 
17.512* 25.137* 21.631** 
 
(1.01) (1.02) 
 
(1.68) (1.89) (2.37) 
moyeduc -0.056 -0.036 
 
-0.229 -0.483 -0.481 
 
(-0.11) (-0.08) 
 
(-0.57) (-0.96) (-1.10) 
cites 0.191 0.190 
 
0.145 0.084 0.061 
  (1.48) (1.49) 
 
(1.40) (0.67) (0.42) 
Ecoreglag0 
   
0.350** 0.810* 
 
    
(2.08) (1.95) 
 Ecoreglag1 
   
  
0.499** 
(1year lag) 
   
  
(2.32) 
F-statistics 5.57*** 6.12*** 
 
 
3.88*** 7.98*** 
R2 0.4582 0.4571 
 
 
0.5172 0.5417 
Squared corr. 
  
0.515 
  N 48 48 
 
48 48 48 
Sargan N*R-sq test        2.053  Chi-sq(2)    P-value = 0.3583 
Basmann test              1.519  Chi-sq(2)    P-value = 0.4679 
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This theory is however less relevant in Sub-Saharan Africa, where people have more basic 
needs in general and low influence on government decision. Here, we think that the important 
size of the population in the region catches the country’s economic size, which is correlated 
with more government interventions even in environmental field. Government effectiveness is 
not significant at the 10% level. 
4.2 Strategic interaction model  
Table 2.Spatial tests results 
 
Weighting scheme 
 
Geographical 
proximity 
Weighted 
geographical 
proximity 
Similarity-based 
proximity 
Geographical and 
similarity based 
proximity 
 
WG WGi WGp WSi WSp WGSi WGSp 
Moran’s I 0.201** 0.233** 0.014 0.008 -0.129 0.055 0.317** 
LMlag 3.190* 2.660* 0.011 0.023 2.375 0.306 2.607* 
LMerror 1.143 0.989 0.046 1.219 0.158 0.599 2.04 
LMlag robust 3.900* 2.637 0.505 3.559* 6.780* 0.121 0.561 
LMerror robust 1.853 0.966 0.54 4.755* 4.563* 0.414 0.000 
* Indicates p-value less than 0.10; ** Indicates p-value less than 0.05; *** Indicates p-value less than 0.01. 
 
Before the estimation of the spatial lag model, we performed some diagnostics tests to check 
for the presence of spatial dependence, and if so if a spatial lag model is the correct 
specification. Results of spatial tests are presented in table 2. For three weighting schemes out 
of four, we get significant statistics. These weighting scheme integrate geographical 
proximity. On the contrary, the statistics of the weighting scheme based on similarity 
regardless nearest neighbor concept, are not significant.  
The z-values of Moran I test are positive and highly significant for WG, WGi and WGSp. This 
indicates the presence of positive spatial autocorrelation.  For the same matrices, the LM test 
for the spatial lag is also statistically significant. In the remaining cases, the null hypothesis of 
spatial lag parameter is rejected. The robust LMlag and LMerror confirm the spatial 
autoregressive specification, with probability values near 90% only when the spatial weights 
matrix is based on geographical proximity. For WGi and WGSp, the tests suggest that we have 
both spatial error dependence and spatial lag structure.  
These results confirm that the spatial dependence within countries can take the form of a 
spatial lag specification. The findings suggest also that the interdependence is reliant on 
geographical proximity. The evidence highlights finally that a nonzero estimates of  in 
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equation [2], with WG the contiguity matrix, will not be due to uncorrected spatial error 
dependence, but instead will reflect the existence of strategic interaction.  
 
Results for the models with strategic decision variable are presented from column 3 to 5 of 
Table 1. According to literature, we use ML estimation (column 3), IV estimation (column 4)2 
and the procedure for Smith (1997) and Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) (column 5)  to solve 
problem of endogeneity and spatial error dependence in the regression (Smith 1997; Kelejian 
and Prucha, 1998; Bruckner, 2003; Fredriksson and Millimet, 2002). We use matrix WG for 
all spatial models.   
From all spatial models, we find that neighborliness influences biodiversity conservation 
strategies in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, one country’s score with respect to current 
neighboring level of biodiversity conservation is positive and significant at, at least the 10% 
level in all regression. It appears that a change in neighborhood average percentage of 
protected biomes results in a positive change in own country. It could be argued that countries 
incorporate information of neighboring states in their own conservation strategies. Interesting 
findings were derived from the inclusion of the strategic decision variable in the simple 
model. It appears that governance variable became significant. The degree to which a country 
achieves the target of protecting at least 10% of each terrestrial biome within its borders is 
correlated with the quality of public services, policy formulation, its implementation and the 
credibility of government’s commitment. Such an important finding in the comprehension of 
conservation effort in Sub-Saharan Africa would have been concealed, if the spatial 
relationship had been occulted. This confirms Anselin (1988) assumption that ignoring spatial 
effect has some serious consequences in a model. 
4.3 Economic competition analysis 
Table 3 (a&b) presents a set of results on economic competition analysis. No insight is 
obtained allowing strategic interaction via competition for environmental aid. Indeed, the 
inclusion of the aid gap variable does not affect the magnitude and significance of the 
coefficients of strategic decision variable on ecoregion score (column 1 table 3a). Secondly, 
the coefficient on the aid gap variable is not statistically significant in the multivariate 
regression (column 1 table 3a). This indicates that environmental aid gap between a country 
and its neighbor has no influence on that country’s effort in biodiversity conservation. 
                                                 
2
 The set of instruments includes population, population density and resource endowment from neighboring 
states, using the same weighting scheme as the independent variable 
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Furthermore, the strategic decision variable has no effect on aid gap variable (column 1 table 
3b).  
 
t-statistics are in parentheses; * Indicates p-value less than 0.10; ** Indicates p-value less than 0.05; *** Indicates p-value 
less than 0.01. 
 
An adverse effect occurs with tourism gap variable. We observe that the coefficient of tourism 
gap variable is highly significant, affects negatively country ecoregion score in the 
multivariate model (column 2 table 3a), and changes the coefficient of strategic decision 
variable. The magnitude of the change is however very low. This is certainly due to the 
Table 3a.Estimations results for economic competition models (equation 4a) 
Dependant variable : Ecoregion Score of country i 
Variables Gap-aid Model Gap-tourism model 
Robustness check for  
Gap-tourism model   
forinitial1 0.845*** 0.794*** 0.863*** 
 
 
(4.65) (3.85) (4.55) 
 
agrigdp 0.341 0.292 0.34 
 
 
(0.84) (0.65) (0.81) 
 
lgdp 2.25 -0.482 2.928 
 
 
(0.30) (-0.06) (0.37) 
 
exportm -0.138 0.103 -0.155 
 
 
(-0.34) (0.25) (-0.37) 
 
moydens -0.005 0.002 -0.005 
 
 
(-0.14) (0.06) (-0.13) 
 
moypopto 3.00 E-7* 3.44 E-7* 2.81 E-7 
 
 
(1.68) (2.02) (1.6) 
 
moygov1 14.22 19.77* 11.48 
 
 
(1.51) (1.99) (1.08) 
 
moyeduc -0.38 -0.442 -0.404 
 
 
(-0.92) (-0.95) (-0.94) 
 
cites 0.04 0.049 0.033 
 
  (0.27) (0.31) (0.23) 
 
Ecoreglag1 0.5** 0.471** 0.436* 
 
 
(2.32) (2.39) (1.94) 
 
Gap_aid 
-0.066   
 (-0.52)   
Gap_tourism  -0.03**  
 
(-2.39) 
 
Tour  0.039**  
 (2.29)  
Tour_neighbors  -0.007  
      (-0.19) 
 
F-statistics 9.08*** 7.38*** 8.48*** 
 
R2 0.5729 0.5448 0.5783 
 
Squared corr. 
   
N 48 48 48 
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tourism data used in the analysis. Averaged data (1990-2005) was used for proxy 2008 data, 
and thus undervalued the indicator. The next step of the transmission channel investigation 
reveals that the comparative conservation performance is not a significant factor in explaining 
variations in tourism gap (column 2 table 3b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can therefore conclude that, the indirect effect of neighboring countries conservation 
efforts on a country’s own conservation effort, though tourism market share competition is 
not obvious. Nevertheless, we have observed that tourism gap has a direct effect on country 
conservation effort. This finding suggests that conservation effort in a country is affected by 
tourism activity in that country along with its adjoining countries. The development of 
regional tourism seems to have therefore some influence on biodiversity conservation. 
Robustness of this  result was check by including separately the different parts of the tourism 
gap variable -ie- tourism indicator for own country (Tour) and averaged neighborhood 
tourism indicator (Tour_neighbors)  in the model (column 3 table 3a). The effect of tourism 
gap variable was found to be mainly driven by the tourism activity in own country. The 
coefficient of tourism arrivals is positive and statistically significant. The impact of 
neighboring tourism is not significant and marginal. State’s conservation performances are 
thus influenced by the development of their own tourism activity and nor by tourism activity 
in adjoining countries.  
While the analysis doesn’t support that strategic interaction occurred via competition for 
tourism or aid, it was noted that the inclusion of gap variables as well as other independent 
variables (spatially lagged or not) do not significantly remove the influence of neighboring 
conservation efforts on a country own conservation effort.  
 
Table 3b.Estimations results for economic competition models (equation 4b) 
Dependant variable : Gap_Iit-1 
Variables Gap-aid Model Gap-tourism model   
   
 
   
 
Ecoreg_Lag1 -0.32 -0.133 
 
(-0.24) (-0.68) 
 
Cons 26.49 17.63 
 
(0.27) (1.11) 
 
F-statistics 0.06 0.46 
 
R2 0.001 0.008 
 
N 48 48 
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5 Conclusion  
Factors influencing biodiversity conservation effort is an area of study with insufficient 
literature and hence requires more studies to be conducted in that body of research, especially 
for tropical countries. This paper presents an empirical investigation on this issue for Sub-
Saharan Africa countries using a cross-country analysis. The question of whether trans-
boundary influences play a role in biodiversity conservation efforts in sub-Saharan 
developing countries was addressed. For this purpose, a spatial lag model was adopted. It 
indicated that economic competition may lead to engagement of countries in strategic 
environmental policymaking.  A data set of 48countries spanning over the period 1990-2009 
and Ecoregion score (2009) as measure for countries biodiversity protection level, were used. 
Following, is a summary of the major findings of the analysis. Firstly, the country protected 
biome’s area is primarily related to resource endowment, effective governance, and tourism 
activities. Secondly, data   analysis suggests that countries are influenced by their contiguous 
neighbors in environmental policy for biodiversity management. Thirdly, the interdependence 
between countries for conservation strategies is not as a result of competition for tourism 
market share or environmental aid.  
These results must be however interpreted with caution. Indeed, empirical analysis of 
strategic interaction among countries generally uses times series data spanning one or more 
decades for a set of countries (Devereux et al., 2008; Altshuler and Goodspeed, 2002; 
Redoano, 2007). Detailed data on conservation effort at the country level do not exist over 
these time scales for most countries, unfortunately. 
Despite this shortcoming, this paper adds to the research on global biodiversity conservation. 
In fact, in that issue the developing countries are at the forefront. Most of the world’s 
biodiversity in terms of species abundance and diversity is found in developing countries. 
They home also the poorest and one third of humanity who generally rely on natural resources 
of their environment for their livelihoods. Enhancing conservation effort in these regions is 
therefore crucial to maintain some global environmental services. In this respect, the study 
recommends for sub-Saharan African countries to strengthen effective governance –i.e.-
quality of public services, policy formulation and its implementation, and the credibility of 
government’s commitment to induce stringent conservation policies. As neighboring 
countries interact, regional collaboration in biodiversity conservation strategies should be 
reinforced. It is also recommended that strategies rely on economic incentives like tourism 
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outcomes in order to influence the decisions of policymakers and inspire dedication from 
leaders in governance to biodiversity conservation. 
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Appendix B. Countries in the sample 
 
Angola 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Djibouti 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia, The 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe
Source: Author with shape files from Conservation International 
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Appendix 1.Statistics on Ecoregion Score (2009) 
  
Central 
Africa 
Eastern 
Africa 
Southern 
Africa 
Western 
Africa 
Western 
indian Ocean 
Afrique Sub-
saharienne 
Mean Ecoregion score  79,577 57,2893 79,3848 71,9337 44,6695 69,91 
Ecoregion=0 13% 0% 0% 0% 25% 4% 
Ecoregion <50 13% 44% 27% 31% 75% 33% 
Ecoregion >50 88% 56% 73% 69% 25% 67% 
Ecoregion =100 25% 11% 36% 19% 25% 23% 
 
 
Appendix  2. Independent variables summary statistics 
Variable 
 
  
Unit Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
Data source 
Ecoreg % 69,91 36,48272 0 100 http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/epi/ 
GDP US$ 1153,46 1724,589 137,7816 7994,31 World Development Indicator 
Trade % 74,31 35,15738 28,01144 163,7785 World Development Indicator 
Dens hab/sq.km 73,84 102,8518 2,159947 576,4587 World Development Indicator 
Popto  1,39E+07 2,15E+07 79306,85 1,24E+08 World Development Indicator 
Gov_effvt  0,7535132 0,6037337 -2,092727 0,6327273 World Governance Indicator 
Educ 
 
% 49,88711 15,59739 7,9 83 
International Human development Indicator 
Agri_gdp % 29,0314 16,63044 3,231028 66,92438 World Development Indicator 
Forestcover % 31,40476 23,62931 0,2588438 89,13043 FAO 
Cites % 66.1875  39.12536     0        100 Word Resources Institute 
Tour  200,5172 243,1203 0 1019,4 UNWTO 
Aid_envt US$ 33,63455 34,88484 0,1034003 158,2853 OECD database 
  
 
        
 
 
Appendix 3.  Weighting scheme 
Weigthingscheme 
 
Weight 
matrix 
 
Matrix elementsdefinition 
 
Geographical 
proximity  
 
WG  wij= 1/Ni if i and j share a border; wij = 0 otherwise; and Ni = 
the number of borders state i shares. 
 
Weighted 
geographical 
proximity 
 
WGi  
  *+,	 *+ , with j - Ji 
 
 
WGp  
  .,	 . , with j - Ji 
 
Similarity-based 
proximity 
 
WSi  
  /0,12,	 /0,12 , with i#j , 1  3*+  *+3 
 
 
WSp  
  /0,12,	 /0,12 , with i#j , 1  3.  .3 
 
Geographical and 
similarity based 
proximity 
 
WGSi  
  /0,12,	 /0,12 , with j - Ji; 1  3*+  *+3 
Ji=set of countries neighboring country i:Weight matrices are row standardized such that their rows 
sum to unity in order to compute neighborhood averages 
 
